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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

General of the Army George C. Marshall on Operational Leadership

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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06 November 2007

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE OPERATIONS PAPER ABSTRACT

General of the Army George C. Marshall on Operational Leadership

The Second World War provided a host of challenges for America's strategic leaders. It can be argued that their most critical challenge was choosing the right operational artists and theater-strategists for the Allied cause. Strategic leaders needed the right operational artists to lead forces in a global, combined, joint fight that spanned four theaters of war and fifteen theaters of operations. Of the national-strategic leaders involved in the selection of theater and operational commanders, General of the Army George C. Marshall stands out. Global war dwarfed military endeavors of the past, requiring an unprecedented number of theater strategists and operational artists. The United States had no formal method to pick these leaders, relying on the professional judgment of men like General Marshall. To fulfill this role he followed the guidance and example of his predecessors; he relied on his experience, preference, and education to select the right operational leaders, then supported them fully. Operational artists and theater-strategists, like Dwight D. Eisenhower, were chosen because they possessed traits Marshall valued, and those traits remain relevant for study and application today.

The truly great leader overcomes all difficulties, and campaigns and battles are nothing but a long series of difficulties to be overcome”...the real leader displays his qualities in his triumph over adversity, however great it may be.¹----George C. Marshall, 18 September 41, speech to first OCS graduates, Fort Benning

Personal characteristics are more important than ever before in warfare.²----Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1948

The Second World War provided a host of challenges for America’s strategic leaders. It can be argued that their most critical challenge was choosing the right operational artists and theater-strategists for the Allied cause. Strategic leaders needed the right operational artists to lead forces in a global, combined, joint fight that spanned four theaters of war and fifteen theaters of operations.³ Of the national-strategic leaders involved in the selection of theater and operational commanders, General of the Army George C. Marshall stands out. One anecdote conveys the difficulties and adversity he faced: the Army grew from a pre-war 200,000 soldiers to 1.4 million (36 divisions, 64 air groups) in 1941, then to nearly 5.4 million (73 divisions, 167 air groups) before 1943 dawned.⁴ Global war dwarfed military endeavors of the past, requiring an unprecedented number of theater strategists and operational artists. The United States had no formal method to pick these leaders, relying on the professional judgment of men like General Marshall.⁵ To fulfill this role he followed the guidance and example of his predecessors; he relied on his experience, preference, and education to select the right operational leaders, then supported them fully.⁶ Operational artists and theater-strategists, like Dwight D. Eisenhower, were chosen because they possessed traits Marshall valued, and those traits remain relevant for study and application today.

It is widely accepted that Marshall chose men like “Eisenhower, Bradley, Smith, Ridgeway, Gerow, Collins, Arnold, Clark, Taylor, Eichelberger, McNair, and Spaatz” to lead.⁷ These men functioned at the operational level of war – theater strategists and operational artists all – where “campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted,

and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas...link[ing] tactics and strategy.”⁸ Marshall demanded that these men possess and demonstrate traits he considered valuable.⁹ His traits became one of the nation’s most valuable resources because they, more than anything else, were what put the right people in the right positions.¹⁰ These personnel choices, often discussed anecdotally or in passing, were critical. No amount of soldiers poorly led would guarantee victory, but enough soldiers, ably led around the world, would.¹¹ Marshall’s choice of Eisenhower to lead in Europe offers a case study that blends theater strategist and operational artist, while the Marshall-Eisenhower model itself provides unique insight for leader selection today. Understanding Marshall’s thoughts and choices and the extraction of lessons for today requires an understanding of Marshall. Since it was Marshall’s “measure of a man” that elevated Eisenhower – arguably America’s most successful operational leader in the Twentieth Century – we must take our own measure of Marshall.

MARSHALL’S BACKGROUND

This brief examination of Marshall’s past focuses on his most valued leadership traits, the personal and professional preferences he developed through the years that provide clues to how he chose subordinates. In the late 1880s a future American General of the Army was playing in one of western Pennsylvania’s many barns.¹² Marshall Senior certainly did not see or approve of a successful soldier’s career in his son’s future. Regardless, the young, not-so-scholarly Marshall was sent to the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) in 1897.¹³ Marshall knew VMI provided formative leadership challenges and he was serious about cadet leadership. He remarked that his life lesson at VMI was unfailing attention to detail.¹⁴ Commissioned on 03 February 1902, Lieutenant Marshall

left for the Philippines immediately.¹⁵ One of his most significant memories involved setting up a successful organization day for his unit, at a time when the command climate was poor and morale low.¹⁶ His most significant lesson involved morale and his recognition of the spiritual power found in this intangible trait. Marshall left America's minimal empire to take his post on America's disappearing frontier. When he arrived out west Secretary of War Elihu Root's educational reforms were taking root and the young man's professional education had begun. While not much to write home about, it was a start.¹⁷ Frontier duty itself offered some independence, but it was not challenging and Marshall struggled with "hardships and a lack of sympathy" for officers doing their duty, as he eagerly awaited reassignment.¹⁸ Reassignment eventually came with his application to and acceptance at Fort Leavenworth's Infantry and Cavalry School. What followed was a year of "hard work, concentration, and competition." His hard work led to a second year of school, followed by teaching duties in Kansas. While in Kansas Marshall advised the Pennsylvania National Guard and learned valuable lessons regarding officer training.¹⁹ It was also at Leavenworth that Marshall recorded some thoughts on leadership. In a letter to a friend he made note of his commander's – Major General John F. Morrison – weaknesses; he was a "miserable judge of men...[who] couldn't hear...views other than his own, [and] he understood nothing of the necessity of compromise."²⁰ Marshall's criticism showed what he valued.

Following Leavenworth Marshall was assigned to an Infantry Regiment, but immediately detached to serve as assistant signal officer for division exercises in Texas. He worked with his first wireless set, airplanes, and ran a signal corps tactical problem to simulate division operations.²¹ This challenge and the new technologies encountered

offered challenges he embraced.²² Marshall was then sent to advise the Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, where he organized state-wide maneuvers, taught a myriad of classes, ran “map problems,” and participated in officer training. The young officer was broadening his experiences and forming opinions.²³ He received another broadening assignment when he was tasked to help Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss run the Connecticut Maneuver Campaign. This exercise offered a unique, demanding challenge that exposed Marshall to issues beyond the tactical realm. BG Bliss later congratulated Marshall for his efforts and a *New York World* journalist gave Marshall singular credit for planning a campaign that used soldiers from 6 states and the regular Army.²⁴

The regular Army soon sent Marshall back to the Philippines. In very short order he was successfully “commanding” 4,842 men during field exercises.²⁵ When modern military officers would be leading one hundred men, Marshall led nearly five thousand in overseas maneuvers where they “put to sea, landed...and advanced [sixty miles] on Manila...[as] an invading force hostile to the US.” The action also involved “1100 animals, 125 vehicles, 130,000 rations, [and] 20 days forage.”²⁶ Marshall’s performance was remarkable. Even though he needed sick leave after the “campaign,” he quickly turned his attention to touring Manchurian battlefields. Marshall was interested enough in this recent combat action to pay his own way. The report he submitted was remarkable, but relevant commentary for purposes of leadership analysis involves his detailed study of recent combat and self-development.²⁷ What followed were two assignments as aide-de-camp: first to BG Hunter Liggett²⁸ and, when reassigned to the United States, aide to MG Franklin Bell during the Mexican crisis. The most notable trait to surface in this period was Marshall’s candor. He demonstrated it by openly criticizing

Bell for making too many speeches. The criticism even caused discomfort with Mrs. Bell, but Marshall felt it was his duty to be candid.²⁹

As the nation contemplated world war, MG Bell was given command of the Department of the East. He took Marshall with him. Hospitalized for his first two weeks in command, Bell left strict orders that Marshall would run the “staff of about fifteen old colonels.”³⁰ Marshall was rapidly introduced to the complexity of mobilizing a democracy, but the exposure was short-lived. Captain Marshall was soon assigned as Assistant Chief of Staff, 1st Expeditionary Force, Brigadier General William Sibert commanding.³¹ The new command started offloaded in France on 26 June 1917.³² Marshall’s first task was to arrange billeting and training facilities for US divisions that would follow. These and other operational logistics and infrastructure issues posed from the operational movement of forces soon gave way to tactical staff challenges.³³ A year later, Lieutenant Colonel Marshall was denied service with troops on the line. Instead, he was ordered to American Expeditionary Force (AEF) Headquarters on 8 July 1918,³⁴ where he wrote, “[t]o me this was a different world.” The tactician had become an operational planner, handling “ocean tonnage, ports of debarkation, dock construction, tank manufacture, methods of training divisions, and inter-Allied politics.”³⁵

The new operational artist was soon planning a 17–division offensive to reduce the St. Mihiel Salient. This major operation on the American front required careful sequencing and synchronization, followed by repositioning for future operations to seize Sedan.³⁶ Marshall’s subsequent “Plan of Future Movements” involved 4 corps and 20 divisions (not including artillery and trains), as well as French units in the area of operations.³⁷ The tutorial that Marshall experienced provided a clear distinction between

tactics and operational art. If clarity was a problem Colonel Marshall (promoted 17 September 1918³⁸) faced a definitive test when he authored a “Study of possible advance of American Troops into Germany.” This memorandum, worthy of study today,³⁹ was followed by a second that discussed “German refusal of Armistice Conditions.” In both he considered the impact of theater and national strategic issues on operational factors and outcomes, as well as key points of ‘Phase IV’ operations.⁴⁰ Operational experience bridged strategy and tactics, balancing and informing education, judgment, and opinions.

Immediately following the war Marshall faced two intellectual challenges. The first was the complete reorganization of the Army. The AEF Commander, General John J. Pershing, gave a copy of House Resolution 14560 to his staff and demanded analysis and response. Marshall was selected to write Pershing’s response to the sweeping reforms suggested by the resolution.⁴¹ Marshall’s second intellectual hurdle came when he was ordered to participate in a speaking tour to addressing units of the AEF. His team was to educate Americans on “the extent of the organization built up [in Europe], the character of the difficulties overcome and the magnitude of the active operations of our armies.” The AEF soldiers would be well-informed military ambassadors and AEF leaders would use them to get their message out.⁴² These intellectual tasks gave Marshall a unique opportunity to reflect on the impact and meaning of the war, driving personal synthesis and growth. Before returning to America Marshall was rewarded for his exceptional work with an assignment as aide-de-camp for the AEF commander. Pershing’s priority for the five years Marshall was by his side was publication of the First Army’s history, but he was constantly “distracted” by Congressional testimony and duties as the Army Chief of Staff. Marshall dealt with issues at the highest levels and the

lessons learned in this period proved invaluable as he reorganized and led the Army during World War II. His immersion in national military policy and politics was total⁴³ and during these years Marshall reaffirmed his belief in and value of the traits of hard work, attention to detail, and candor.⁴⁴

Marshall's first views on operational leadership appeared in one of his letters in 1920. Captain, then Major,⁴⁵ Marshall was asked by a friend to share his thoughts and the letter that followed provided a list of leadership traits that had operational relevance. He listed common sense, education, physical strength, optimism, energy, concern for the men, loyalty, and resolute action as critical.⁴⁶ He followed that letter with a confidential address on leadership traits to the Army War College in 1922. In the speech Marshall listed traits required of higher level staff officers – education, optimism, loyalty, and energy were reiterated as essential, but he added staff training, carrying out orders you disagree with, experience, “intimate knowledge of the troops [you] serve,” providing time to subordinates for planning and execution, ability, tolerance of repeated changes in orders, enthusiasm, and careful attention to the precious resource of time for operational staff leaders. For General Staff officers his top three traits were: “[a] method for exercising the supervisory and organizing functions, the necessity for perfect cooperation, and the extreme importance of maintaining a sympathetic understanding with the other elements of the Army.” Marshall claimed General Staff officers succeeded because they were experts at the last two of his top three traits and because they sought “harmonious, united effort[s].” He believed War Department officers were unsuccessful and offered his reasons. They were out of touch and lacked any connection to their directives. They were not close to or affected by those carrying out the directives. This led them to act in

“an impersonal, arbitrary manner.” In essence, Marshall argued that all operational and higher level staff officers needed to adhere to his top three to be successful.⁴⁷

Marshall left Pershing’s side and the United States in 1924. On 8 August Lieutenant Colonel Marshall found himself in Hawaii, enroute to the 15th Regiment in China.⁴⁸ With the ‘Pershing years’ behind him, tactical command waited. Other than experiencing some Chinese infighting, the Marshall family had a blessed overseas tour (he learned Chinese and got some small unit leadership experience).⁴⁹ China was followed by a very short tour at the Army War College, then Assistant Commandant duty at the Infantry School (Fort Benning, Georgia).⁵⁰ At Benning Marshall trained tacticians, not operational level leaders, but he met a lot of future artists.⁵¹ In mid-1932 Marshall went to mobilize the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC),⁵² good practice for the War Department and Marshall,⁵³ but it was not long before the Army Chief – General Douglas MacArthur – reassigned him as Chief of Staff (Senior Advisor) with the 33rd Infantry Division, Illinois National Guard.⁵⁴ Colonel Marshall was very interested in the requirement for mobilization and understood the nation’s dependence on Guardsmen,⁵⁵ even recommending training changes to the Commandant of Leavenworth.⁵⁶

During these years Marshall watched junior officers pass him in grade, even though he benefited from Pershing’s patronage. Brigadier General and a Brigade finally came in 1936.⁵⁷ This meant returning to work with the CCC, on the west coast. He followed CCC duty with an assignment as Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army in the War Plans Division. Not long after he became the Deputy Chief of Staff for the Army,⁵⁸ where he struggled with mobilization, reorganization, and a much needed increase in the military establishment. He fought to acquire the tools to fight. Tools like aircraft needed

to be designed and built before war broke.⁵⁹ In fact, it was a discussion of aircraft that sparked a very candid exchange between Marshall and the President of the United States. Franklin Roosevelt wanted a large Air Corps, which would be siphoned off to help the British. Marshall disagreed, preferring to build U.S. air capacity, and he made his disagreement known in a meeting at the White House.⁶⁰ He pushed in all arenas, from reorganization to industry to maneuvers.⁶¹ In 1939 he was building the strategic leader's case for readiness and soon had the Chief of Staff's bully-pulpit to add emphasis.⁶² Marshall's papers show little discussion of leadership during this period. It is assumed he was too busy to write letters about leaders and that he knew what he believed. When it was time to retire the old breed for the new, he would rely on experience, preference, and education, applying the traits he valued to the pool of available leaders.

THE MARSHALL–EISENHOWER MODEL

By 1939 he knew what traits he valued most. John Nelsen, in *General George C. Marshall: Strategic Leadership and the Challenges of Reconstituting the Army*, claimed Marshall lived the traits of “efficiency, responsiveness, teamwork, initiative, and morale.”⁶³ Even Eisenhower recorded a list of Marshall's traits, in the negative; he claimed Marshall did not want: self-promoters, buck-passers, micro-managers, truculence, spotlight-lovers, trouble-makers, leaders who failed to take leadership seriously in all situations, and pessimists.⁶⁴ While this analysis was useful it was Marshall who inspired this analysis, groomed and picked Eisenhower, and whose method resulted in the selection of a myriad of successful operational artists. The goal of examining the Marshall-Eisenhower model is to identify the traits that mattered most to

Marshall, were most essential for Eisenhower's success, and are applicable for our system of grooming and selecting operational leaders today.

Marshall knew Eisenhower from his work on the American Battle Monuments Commission⁶⁵ and Louisiana Maneuvers.⁶⁶ He assigned Eisenhower as Third Army Chief of Staff in 1941,⁶⁷ noted Eisenhower's potential in his personal records,⁶⁸ and brought him to the Army staff just days after Pearl Harbor. Marshall thought so highly of Eisenhower that he advanced him over 350 more senior officers,⁶⁹ using a system he developed, with Congressional assistance, to rapidly advance people in spite of convention and tradition.⁷⁰ He promoted and supported Eisenhower because his work on the Army staff showed remarkable capacity for success at the highest levels⁷¹ and he passed every test Marshall threw his way.⁷² In short, Eisenhower possessed the traits Marshall valued. But the selection begs questions about key traits Eisenhower did not possess – traits like combat and leadership experience. Add to these significant shortfalls the fact that Eisenhower had no joint, coalition experience. Joint and coalition operations were the only hope in and for Europe. Theater strategists and operational artists in the European Theater had to be joint, coalition team builders or risk failure. In these three critical categories Eisenhower fell short. While reputation and performance brought Eisenhower to Marshall's attention,⁷³ similar to the way Pershing was affected by Marshall twenty-five years before,⁷⁴ there had to be impressive characteristics – traits – that made Eisenhower irresistible, despite his shortcomings. Marshall chose and sponsored Eisenhower to command American, then Allied, forces in Europe, once he knew he would not be the theater-strategist himself.⁷⁵ The President, Prime Minister and combined leaders readily approved Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander, a

clear vote of confidence for Marshall's man and proof lessons from the Great War were learned.⁷⁶ In a matter of months Eisenhower went from operational commander under Marshall to theater strategist in place of Marshall. What traits did Marshall, and the combined leaders, see in Eisenhower that merited this level of trust and support?

Context and criteria are needed to determine the traits. Allied strategic leaders, like Marshall, knew the requirements for successful Allied operational artists in 1942. In essence, the Allies needed leaders who could: function independently while adhering to national and coalition goals and agreements; lead joint and coalition teams; focus limited resources on critical objectives to achieve strategic ends; and seize the initiative by making timely, bold decisions in an ambiguous, complex environment. Ironically, this historical baseline offers exactly what we need from operational leaders today, but, more important, it provides the foundation upon which we can develop and apply criteria to pick the traits Marshall most valued. Sources provided solid evidence to support a list of 46 traits that Marshall mentioned or personally followed and these 46 cover the broad spectrum of tangible and intangible traits. The following criteria were used to provide clarity and assist with prioritization: one, to promote original thought, a trait should not be commonly expected (like loyalty); two, traits must be operationally significant (related to the historical baseline); and, three, Marshall must have written or acted on the traits (seldom or never violating them). The criteria are weighted (in reverse order as listed), with Marshall's opinion and action being the most important factor.

Some clarification is required before the traits are selected. First, since Eisenhower lacked combat experience and the accompanying intimate knowledge of soldiers, it is logical to conclude that Marshall did not weight these traits as highly as

others. His trait method was flexible and weighted, like our criteria. Marshall also faced the universal truth that certain missions would not suit certain people (General George Patton was not as well suited for joint, coalition command⁷⁷ as he was for command of an Army⁷⁸). Therefore, the goal was to find traits Marshall valued regardless of personality and/or mission. Finally, it was important to consider how characteristics combined in a person for maximum effect, rather than studying individual traits in isolation – synchronizing traits. Like synchronized operational functions deliver effects that are greater than the sum of their parts, so should traits of an operational leader be synchronized for maximum benefit. So, the traits were considered singularly, in combination with one another, and as parts of a whole. The short list of traits nearly wrote itself; Marshall valued three things in Eisenhower above all else. The first trait was a “cooperative and sympathetic approach.” The joint, coalition team builder had to lead and be part of a very complex team where unity was not assured. Next, Marshall valued Eisenhower’s “mastery of the methods to exercise supervisory and organizing functions.” This emphasis on leader-manager and indirect, institutional leadership skills was critical for Marshall and Eisenhower throughout the war. Finally, the third trait was “flexibility teamed with bold, resolute action.” Eisenhower was a combat leader, after all, and this was absolutely essential when facing Fortress Europe. These were the traits.

MARSHALL APPLIED TO EISENHOWER

Cooperative and sympathetic, or empathetic, approaches may seem suited for social work, vice combat leadership, but not to Marshall.⁷⁹ His work in Washington with the Joint Chiefs built strategic joint teams⁸⁰ and he believed “[m]ilitary victories are...achieved through the efforts of all arms and service.”⁸¹ Major General Fox Connor

had encouraged Eisenhower to work for Marshall because “[he] knows more about the techniques for arranging allied commands than any man I know.” They all knew the deciding factor of the next war would be coalition operations⁸² and this was Eisenhower’s most impressive and necessary trait. Service and coalition cooperation were necessary,⁸³ so much so that Marshall called coalition operations the key that “spell[ed] the ultimate defeat of the Axis Powers.”⁸⁴ Both leaders worked from this base from the start.⁸⁵ Eisenhower was committed to this trait and captured the spirit best when he said, “unity, coordination, and cooperation are the keys to successful operations.”⁸⁶ He did not believe in a separate land, air, and sea war, but in cooperative actions against a shared objective – spoken like a true operational artist. Further, he required his Allied organization to act as if it responded to one country, not several.⁸⁷ There was infighting, but it did not derail the Allies. In fact, the worst coalition infighting offered Eisenhower his biggest challenge and success, while “living” this trait. The challenge came after the German counterattack in the Ardennes⁸⁸ when the British pushed for an overall ground commander. Marshall briefly intervened, threatening resignation if ground command passed to a Brit, but Eisenhower exerted leadership, remaining cooperative and sympathetic.⁸⁹ The coalition stayed together, partly because Eisenhower faced this with men like his English Deputy Commander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder. Tedder, who later received high praise for being a “staunch supporter of the “allied” principle,”⁹⁰ was symbolic of the operational level coalition officers Eisenhower valued on his team.⁹¹ He built a command that demanded a cooperative and sympathetic approach, giving him the moral high ground and impartiality he needed during inevitable infighting. Later Eisenhower wrote that the “first and most enduring lesson of the Mediterranean and

European campaigns was proof that war can be waged effectively by a coalition of nations.”⁹² In no small way, Eisenhower was the architect of this unique, original, successful, unified, cooperative, sympathetic approach to war and this analysis proves the primacy of this trait in his selection and success. Marshall knew what he was doing.

Command usually sparks images of singular, decisive leadership, as opposed to a cooperative or sympathetic campaigner; leadership is glorified and management vilified. However, mastery of methods to exercise supervisory and organizing functions is the foundation for sequencing and synchronization...keys to the operational art. The word manager is not anathema because the great artist needs this skill. Marshall believed that “military procedure of command and staff” amounted to “business practices.”⁹³ He also noted Eisenhower’s “refreshing approach to problems” on the Army staff as a definite strength.⁹⁴ Marshall valued his ability to delegate work to masters, like Eisenhower, assuming success as leaders proved their merit.⁹⁵ Eisenhower agreed – “the staffs through which the modern commander absorbs information and exercises his authority must be a beautifully interlocked, smooth-working mechanism.”⁹⁶ When Eisenhower was sent to England he selected General Walter Smith as his Chief of Staff because the officer was “a godsend – a master of detail with clear comprehension of main issues.”⁹⁷ He and his team needed management skills to succeed. The first traits Eisenhower praised in General Mark Clark were managerial – Clark was his “best organizer, planner, and trainer.”⁹⁸ After invading Africa, with some experience, Eisenhower wrote that “in the higher positions...rich organizational experience...[was] essential to success.”⁹⁹ Eisenhower then supported General Jacob Devers, who lacked what might be considered essential combat experience, to lead all American forces in the Mediterranean because he

was a “very fine administrator.”¹⁰⁰ This does not mean individual leaders lacked importance in the Marshall–Eisenhower “system;” Eisenhower was very specific on this point.¹⁰¹ It simply means that, for the modern leader, mastery of management principles was considered essential. Selection of Clark and Devers – even Eisenhower – offers more than anecdotal evidence that this trait was critical, even when compared to something as critical as combat experience.

In combat there are seldom traits that receive higher praise than flexibility teamed with bold, resolute action. When teamed with cooperation, sympathy/empathy, mastery of supervision and organization this completes the basic traits requirements for the successful operational artist. The cooperative manager establishes conditions that support organizational and decision–making flexibility, while guaranteeing bold and determined action. This was Marshall’s third critical trait¹⁰² for operational leaders – they had to know how and when to balance flexibility with boldness. As if he was writing to make this very point, Eisenhower argued that “one of the most important characteristics of the successful officer today is his ability to continue changing his methods, almost even his mental processes, in order to keep abreast of changes...but the high commander mustbe calm, clear, and determined.”¹⁰³ He showed this early, still under Marshall’s wing, with “Germany First.” His plan was flexible (giving options), bold (no “half-priorities”), and resolute (once selected commitment must be complete).¹⁰⁴ Marshall and Eisenhower showed their colors again when Roosevelt agreed to Churchill’s “indirect approach” in Europe.¹⁰⁵ Marshall and Eisenhower had already coordinated and received British military agreement on a direct approach, but lost the end game with Churchill. They were flexible, adjusting quickly to plan the bold, resolute

action needed to invade North Africa and Italy, while resolutely holding onto plans for an invasion of France.¹⁰⁶ Once in Italy Eisenhower found himself between Churchill, who applauded bold Allied action to date, and Marshall, who demanded bolder action to seize Rome. Marshall's critique bothered Eisenhower more than Churchill's praise pleased – he missed lunch and dinner to draft a response to Marshall.¹⁰⁷ Eisenhower told Marshall that “boldness is ten times as important as numbers”¹⁰⁸ and recorded sincere disappointment in his diary at being considered “timid.”¹⁰⁹ It is difficult to argue that OVERLORD was not bold. During planning the British pushed to cancel the supporting invasion of southern France.¹¹⁰ However, Eisenhower saw the opportunity for bold, decisive action and increased Allied flexibility...it stayed.¹¹¹ Marshall then pressed Eisenhower for bold, strategic use of massed airborne forces to support the Normandy landings. Eisenhower resisted, but tellingly wrote, “I instinctively dislike ever to uphold the conservative as opposed to the bold.”¹¹² He did boldly order operationally significant airborne action for D-Day, in spite of Air Chief Marshall Leigh-Mallory's vehement objections.¹¹³ Once firmly established in France, during the bitter winter fighting around Bastogne, Eisenhower and his team demonstrated remarkable operational flexibility, were bold in the relief of surrounded forces, and resolute when pressured to give ground force command to the British.¹¹⁴ Both Marshall and Eisenhower were open to change and flexible in approach, but shared bold determination that brought victory.¹¹⁵ The cross-pairing of flexibility with bold/resolute action offers a contradiction. Much like a cooperative approach is appears contradictory to conventional military wisdom. But it is in the pairing and blending of these traits, like the synchronization of operational functions, that we find the great leaders, decisions, and successes of military history.

COUNTER ARGUMENTS

The skeptic could attack analysis of the Marshall–Eisenhower model and these traits by examining the traits and arguing against their relevance. In other words, choose any trait Marshall valued and show where he ignored it in application. This counter is intellectually weak – the “chink in the armor” is too simplistic. Further, it is based on scientific theory. Operational art is just that – art, as is leadership. Use of a scientific model to disprove this hypothesis disregards subjective and human aspects. The more meaningful attack would be aimed at leadership trait theory, the foundation of the argument. There are leaders that exhibit all the “right traits,” but are not good. For example, Joseph Stalin shared traits with Adolf Hitler, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill. Motivation becomes the factor; Hitler and Stalin by survival and domination. However, Roosevelt, who brought nuclear war to the world, and Churchill, complicit in area bombing German cities, were arguably motivated by the defense of freedom. Therefore, traits fall to motivation. In addition, there are good leaders with none of the “required traits” and bad leaders that have them all, so traits lack relevance. These arguments are simplistic and wrong. First, they do not disprove the existence of leadership traits, they attack application. Also, the leaders still possessed traits that can be identified and defended. The fact that leaders choose good or bad does not disprove trait theory, nor does this argument account for systems and/or cultures. One could also assume traits are inadequate because they depend on interaction between leader and led. This fails to eliminate the relevance of and value in trait study. Finally, attacks of trait theory often focus on civilians, but military application is different. Competence offers an example – it is a common must for military leaders. Competence feeds trust, breeding

loyalty, fostering a positive command climate, and improving morale. This is not so clear for civilian leaders who answer to a bottom line.¹¹⁶ In the end, no argument can remove the fact that leader traits exist and served as a guide for Marshall's selections.

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt Marshall picked his artists,¹¹⁷ Eisenhower even witnessed his deliberations.¹¹⁸ While his choices depended on many factors, he clearly tested leaders to ensure they possessed traits he valued.¹¹⁹ Just as Pershing evaluated and prepared Marshall, so Marshall developed Eisenhower as he passed the torch of leadership.¹²⁰ Eisenhower had plenty of "help" from Marshall, but was largely left to command, while receiving the full support of his Chief of Staff. Marshall could afford this hands-off approach because he knew the character of the man he picked.¹²¹ This support never stopped – when Marshall retired he recommended Eisenhower as the next Chief¹²² – because Marshall's use of traits guaranteed a trust and understanding that were spiritual, not rational. Marshall even wrote that "the selection of leaders...[for example,] Eisenhower [and company were] the most remarkable team," was the critical contribution to the war.¹²³ Eisenhower, recognizing the value of identifying leaders with the right traits, added that "personal characteristics [were] more important [now in war] than ever before."¹²⁴ It is easy to see that the combination of these three critical traits – a cooperative and sympathetic approach, the mastery of the methods to exercise supervisory and organizing functions, flexibility teamed with bold, resolute action – in Eisenhower was the key to his, and the coalition's, ultimate success. They represented American example of joint, coalition campaign leadership that is better than any other combination of the 46 traits Marshall valued. We must incorporate these lessons of the

Marshall–Eisenhower model into our educational and developmental systems to guarantee the right artists and strategists command at the operational level. It is hard to argue that Marshall and Eisenhower did a bad job, so logic dictates that the application of these lessons offers a great start point for leaders today.¹²⁵

Annex A:

The Intangible Annex: Marshall's Intangible Traits

Two Parts:

I. Candor

II. Morale

I. CANDOR: At first glance candor fails the test for inclusion. It could be considered a common trait (though it is not in the glossary of *Army Leadership*). While Army doctrine states leaders should “[seek] and [be] open to diverse ideas,”¹²⁶ it is not definitive. However, Marshall lived this trait.¹²⁷ He told Eisenhower to “solve [your] own problems and tell me later what [was] done”¹²⁸ and to disagree with him and be blunt.¹²⁹ Marshall sought capable leaders who disagreed with him.¹³⁰ He even cursed at Churchill, who offered bad military advice in the Mediterranean.¹³¹ Eisenhower was candid before his Marshall years, withstanding MacArthur’s tirades in pursuit of right.¹³² Before invading Africa Eisenhower purposely wrote Marshall that he was committed to the plan, though he knew Marshall and the Joint Chiefs were not enthusiastic¹³³ and candidly shared “dozens of ideas” regarding the operation.¹³⁴ Following the invasion he recommended firing a corps commander that Marshall had recommended.¹³⁵ When Marshall questioned Eisenhower’s commitment to operations in southern France before D-Day, Eisenhower replied “I have never yet failed to give you my own clear personal conviction about every...plan in prospect.”¹³⁶ He went even further. Visiting the President, who was ill in bed at the time, Eisenhower argued against the President’s plan for national zones of occupation in Germany after the war;¹³⁷ arguing with an ill president over what would be a diplomatic and political decision set a new bar for candidness. Eisenhower extended that candid approach to Churchill, clearly stating his case and sticking to his decisions.¹³⁸ He also appreciated candor in his subordinates. Air Chief Marshall Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory candidly deemed American airborne assaults on Normandy as “futile slaughter” of the 82nd and 101st. Eisenhower did not follow the advice, but he appreciated the candor.¹³⁹ This trait was clearly considered vital by Marshall and Eisenhower.

II. MORALE: “The tendency to believe, expect, or hope that things will turn out well” – optimism – is more likely to produce a “passionate interest in or eagerness to do something,” – enthusiasm – in leader and led,¹⁴⁰ but the ability to build and maintain good morale edged past these other intangible traits.¹⁴¹ Good morale was something to be created by a leader, as well as something they needed to exhibit. Marshall believed morale was “more than enthusiasm, something finer and higher than optimism...something in the spirit of man...[in] the soul.”¹⁴² It guided Marshall’s actions, best exemplified during his reorganization of the Army¹⁴³ – “the men who would be relieved and retired [had] given the best they had to the Army”¹⁴⁴ and morale of the organization demanded moderation. Eisenhower was also a firm believer in the power of morale and demonstrated this trait repeatedly. He claimed morale was “always a decisive factor”¹⁴⁵ and he actively pursued it as an end itself, even personally getting involved in the distribution of chocolate and cigarettes.¹⁴⁶ When a journalist predicted 90% casualties in the landings General Omar Bradley visited units to denounce the article and improve morale. Eisenhower then publicized Bradley’s comments.¹⁴⁷ The most telling evidence for Eisenhower, however, was investment of time. In the four months before D-Day he “visited twenty-six divisions, twenty-four airfields, five ships of war, and numerous [other locations],” despite his busy schedule. This paid “big dividends in terms of morale, and morale, given rough equality in other things, [was] supreme on the battlefield.”¹⁴⁸ He passed this on to subordinates, demanding they show a “capacity to develop and maintain” morale, because “it is the greatest single factor in successful war.”¹⁴⁹ Morale was critical from the highest levels of the home fronts to the lowest levels of the trenches.¹⁵⁰

ENDNOTES:

¹ Address for Delivery to the Graduates of the First Officer Candidate School, 27 September 1941, Larry Bland, ed., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Volume II, "We Cannot Delay,"* Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1986, 619-22; Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: "Ordeal and Hope," 1939-1942*, New York, The Viking Press, 1966, page 104.

² Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1948, 75.

³ "A Short History of Operational Art, Lecture Notes of Professor Milan Vego," JMO Department, Naval War College, page 16 (Theaters of Strategic Direction/Theaters of Operations/Command Areas/Dividing Lines Currently Used by U.S. Armed Forces, dated 1 November 1944). Of note, General George C. Marshall noted, in "The Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the Army, 01 July 1943, to 30 June 1945 To The Secretary of War," War Department, 1 September 1945, 76-7, that there were nine Theaters of Operations, called operational areas, but referred to coalition approval in their description, which may account for the discrepancy.

⁴ John T. Nelsen II, *General George C. Marshall: Strategic Leadership and the Challenges of Reconstituting the Army, 1939-41*, Professional Readings in Military Strategy, Number 7, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1993, 2; Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 425.

⁵ Forrest Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Volume 3, "Organizer of Victory," 1943-1945*, New York: The Viking Press, 370-1. Marshall and Eisenhower are described selecting operational leaders for Europe.

⁶ Marshall to Herbert B. Swope, 10 May 1943, Larry Bland, ed., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall: Volume 3, "The Right Man for the Job," December 7, 1941-May 31, 1943*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 686.

⁷ Nelsen, *Strategic Leadership*, 61.

⁸ Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, JCS, 25 January 2002, GL-19.

⁹ Encarta English Dictionary, online; trait is a characteristic or quality that distinguishes someone.

¹⁰ Marshall to Major General Fox Conner, 12 May 1934, Larry Bland, ed., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Volume I, "The Soldierly Spirit, Dec 1880-June 1939*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 429-31. Marshall offered advice on Conner's WWI book proposal. In the letter Marshall commented that Pershing's selection of leaders was enough for its own book and would make this one a "best seller." Specifically, the reference is Pershing's transition from the old guard to more "vigorous, able, determined men."

¹¹ Congressional Testimony, 22 April 41, Bland, *We Cannot Delay*, 483. Marshall was quoted as saying that "You give a good leader very little and he will succeed; you give mediocrity a great deal and they will fail."

¹² George C. Marshall Interview, 21 February 1957, cited in Bland, *Soldierly Spirit*, 4.

¹³ George C. Marshall, Sr. to Brigadier General Scott Shipp (Superintendent of VMI), 11 September 1897 and 21 January 1901, respectively, *Ibid.*, 7, 10.

¹⁴ George C. Marshall Interview, 13 March 1957, *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁵ Report of the Secretary of War, 1901 and George C. Marshall Interview, 13 March 1957, respectively, Ibid., 11, 23.

¹⁶ George C. Marshall Interview, 13 March 1957 and Marshall to Mr. Clyde A. Benton, Ibid., 23-24. There are many examples of Marshall's concern with morale, but one left an impression on me. While commanding the 15th Regiment in China he had an ice rink constructed for the unit and he routinely wrote about the entertainments and activities of the officers and men (Letter to General John J. Pershing, 30 January 1925, Ibid., 273.).

¹⁷ George C. Marshall Interview, 13 March 1957, Ibid., 28. Interestingly, Marshall stopped over briefly in Nagasaki, Japan. He obviously could have no idea how prominently that city would figure in his future. Marshall owed his commission to another Root measure – the 1901 bill to enlarge the Army led to Marshall's commissioning (Howard A. Olsen, "George C. Marshall: Emergence of a Politician," Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, DTIC AD-A227429, 1990, 12).

¹⁸ George C. Marshall Interview, 13 March 1957, Ibid., 36.

¹⁹ George C. Marshall Speech to the Annual Banquet of the Pennsylvania National Guard, 13 October 1939, Ibid., 42-45. His work with the National Guard was so memorable that they actually named one of their camps "Lieutenant George Marshall."

²⁰ George C. Marshall to Colonel Bernard Lentz, 2 October 1935, Ibid., 45-6.

²¹ Tactical Problem Number One for Company D, Signal Corps, and attached Officers, 3 April 1911 and George C. Marshall Interview, 4 April 1957, Ibid., 54-55.

²² Robert Pecoraro, "George Catlett Marshall, Father of the United States Air Force: His Contributions to Air Power," DTIC ADA390644, 4-5. General Arnold stated in his autobiography that he did not believe America would have had an Air Force in World War II without Marshall. Marshall also pushed for Arnold to be considered an equal on the JCS.

²³ Report to the Chief, Division of Militia Affairs, 2 October 1911, Bland, *The Soldierly Spirit*, 57-58.

²⁴ George C. Marshall Interview, 4 April 1957; Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss to Marshall, Letter of Appreciation, 22 August 1912, and *New York World* Article, 17 August 1912, Ibid., 72-73.

²⁵ George C. Marshall Interview, 4 April 1957; Colonel James Erwin to Major General Bell, 20 March 1914; Lieutenant Colonel Clarence Dentler to Bell "White Force umpire" report, Ibid., 76-79.

²⁶ Marshall to Major General Edward Nichols, 5 March 1914 and Marshall to Stuart Marshall, 21 March 1914, Ibid., 80-84.

²⁷ Report to the Adjutant General, Report of visit to Manchurian battlefields, with recommendations, 15 June 1914, Ibid., 85-92. The report was remarkable, and required of officers visiting foreign battlefields.

²⁸ Marshall to Major General Edward Nichols, 4 October 1915, Ibid., 93-95.

²⁹ George C. Marshall Interview, 5 April 1957, Ibid., 98-99. Marshall recalls an exchange with Major General John J. Pershing where he argued with the AEF Commander, in front of the assembled division and AEF staff officers, and literally placed a hand on Pershing's arm to force him to listen. His mates thought he would be relieved, but Marshall recalled that Pershing sought him out for commentary after that incident (Interview, 5 April 1957, 122).

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- ³⁰ George C. Marshall Interview, 4 April 1957, Ibid., 100.
- ³¹ Brigadier General William Sibert to Major General Franklin Bell, 3 June 1917 and Marshall to Major General Edward Nichols, 9 June 1917, Ibid., 104-05.
- ³² First Division War Diary, written by Marshall, 26 June 1917, Ibid., 111. Keeping the diary insured that Marshall knew what was going on in the division.
- ³³ Report to the Commanding General, AEF, 1 August 1917 and George C. Marshall Interview, 5 April 1957, Ibid., 115-18.
- ³⁴ Marshall to the Adjutant General, AEF, 18 June 1918 and Brigadier General Robert C. Davis to Commanding General First Corps, 8 July 1918, Ibid., 144 and 155.
- ³⁵ Marshall's *Memoirs*, cited in Ibid., 152.
- ³⁶ Report to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 16 August 1918 and Memorandum for Commanding Generals, First and Fifth Corps, 5 November 1918, Ibid., 152-55 and 165. On 10 September 1918, Marshall had already drafted plans to move the Americans to Meuse-Argonne for the final actions of the war. Pershing wanted the First American Army to have the "honor" of taking Sedan.
- ³⁷ Plan of Future Movements, 12 November 1918, Ibid., 168-69. The armistice did not slow the planning effort.
- ³⁸ Ibid., 161.
- ³⁹ Study of possible advance of American Troops into Germany, 10 February 1919, Ibid., 175-78.
- ⁴⁰ German refusal of Armistice Conditions, 15 February 1919, Ibid., 179-81.
- ⁴¹ Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, AEF, 16 March 1919, Ibid., 182-3.
- ⁴² Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff, AEF, 20 March 1919, Ibid., 183-4.
- ⁴³ Marshall to Major General James W. McAndrew (Commandant, General Staff College, Washington, DC), 9 July 1920; Marshall Interview, 7 December 1956, Ibid., 195-97, 200-1.
- ⁴⁴ Marshall Interview, 5 April 1957, Ibid., 189, 194.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid, 199. Marshall reverted to his prewar Captain rank on 30 June 1920, but was promoted to Major 1 July.
- ⁴⁶ Marshall to Brigadier General John S. Mallory, 5 November 1920, Ibid., 202-3.
- ⁴⁷ Lecture, Army War College, 19 September 1922, Ibid., 214-7.
- ⁴⁸ Marshall to Pershing, 8 August 1924, Ibid., 259-60.
- ⁴⁹ Marshall to Brigadier General John McA. Palmer, 31 December 1925, Ibid., 284-5. This letter offers an example of the impact of the Chinese civil war and notes that it was Marshall's birthday – 45 years old.
- ⁵⁰ Pershing to Marshall, 6 October 1927, Ibid., 315. Pershing lost his wife and three daughters in a fire in 1915. Marshall to Mrs. Thomas B. Coles, 26 October 1927, Ibid., 316. Marshall was happy to move and looking forward to the new duty.
- ⁵¹ Lecture, Fort Benning, no date, Ibid., 334-8. This offers a great example of Marshall's tactical innovation and thought concerning wars of movement.
- ⁵² Marshall to Madame Jouatte, 15 June 1932 and Marshall to Major General Edward King, 6 April 1933, Ibid., 378, 393.
- ⁵³ Marshall to Pershing, 11 July 1933, Ibid., 398.

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- ⁵⁴ Major General James McKinley to Marshall, 3 October 1933, Ibid., 398-9. MacArthur was asked for an “outstanding infantry officer” and he selected Marshall. MacArthur wrote, “he has no superior among Infantry Colonels.”
- ⁵⁵ Chicago Speech on the Illinois National Guard, 1934, Ibid., 420-3.
- ⁵⁶ Marshall to Major General Heintzelman, 4 December 1933, Ibid., 409-13.
- ⁵⁷ Memorandum for the Secretary of War from President Franklin Roosevelt, 24 May 1935; Marshall to Pershing, 27 December 1935; Marshall to Major General Frank McCoy, 28 August 1936, Ibid., 468, 481-2.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid., 611.
- ⁵⁹ Speech to the American Legion, 4 September 1938 and 6 November 1938, Ibid., 620-5 and 644-8.
- ⁶⁰ Marshall Interview, 6 March 1957, Ibid., 651. Marshall even drafted a letter from Pershing to Roosevelt arguing against the President’s Air Corps proposal (Marshall to Pershing, 23 November 1938, Ibid., 654-6.)
- ⁶¹ Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 9 December 1938, Ibid., 671-3.
- ⁶² Marshall to Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair, 3 May 1939, Ibid., 714.
- ⁶³ Nelsen, *Strategic Leadership*, 55-61.
- ⁶⁴ Eisenhower, *Crusade*, 34-5.
- ⁶⁵ Joseph Dooley, “George C. Marshall, A Study in Mentorship,” Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, DTIC ADA222859, 1990, 15.
- ⁶⁶ Mark Stoler, *George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century*, Boston, Twayne Publishers, 1989, 82.
- ⁶⁷ Bland, *We Cannot Delay*, 534.
- ⁶⁸ Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 237. Marshall kept a book with names of men he thought showed potential for leadership, should the need arise.
- ⁶⁹ Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 98.
- ⁷⁰ Memorandum for the President, 18 July 1940, Bland, *We Cannot Delay*, 270-1 and Bland, *We Cannot Delay*, 655.
- ⁷¹ Entry for 8 June 1942, Robert Ferrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries*, New York, W. W. Norton and Company, 1981, 62; Dooley, Mentorship, 16; Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 322.
- ⁷² Ibid., 338.
- ⁷³ Dwight D. Eisenhower: The Centennial, Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/ike/ike.htm>, 16 March 1990.
- ⁷⁴ Olsen, Politician, 28-9. Eisenhower was not sent to lead in the same theater as MacArthur. This tangent is instructive. Marshall did not allow interpersonal relations to complicate matters. Granted, there were other, more pressing, reasons, but picking the right person for the right job is not an accident.
- ⁷⁵ Olsen, Politician, 124-6. Technically Roosevelt appointed Eisenhower to command American forces (Roosevelt and the Prime Minister of England actually wanted Marshall, but he was needed in Washington)
- ⁷⁶ Howard Condit, “General George C. Marshall, Strategic Leadership and Coalition Warfare,” DTIC, ADA309535, 11-12. The author emphasized unity and direct approach.

⁷⁷ Field Marshal Lord Carver, ed., *The War Lords: Military Commanders of the Twentieth Century*, George Weidenfeld and Nicholson Ltd, 2005, 554-67; Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 405.

⁷⁸ Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 372. This was actually done by Marshall and Eisenhower when picking the leaders for Overlord and follow on actions.

⁷⁹ Condit, *Strategic Leadership*, 18. Marshall claimed he felt “great sympathy” for the allied British and he understood how they could doubt American ability to deliver promised fighting men.

⁸⁰ Entries between 10 February 1942 and 14 March 1942, Ferrell, *Diaries*, 48-51. Read this for an idea of the opinions Eisenhower held about our ability to operate jointly. He suggests shooting Admiral King to help win the war and calls the outgoing CNO a “nice old lady.”

⁸¹ Condit, *Strategic Leadership*, 16; Pecoraro, Father of the Air Force, 4-5; Speech to Air Corps Tactical School, 19 September 1938, Bland, *The Soldierly Spirit*, 631-5.

⁸² Stoler, *Soldier-Statesman*, 41.

⁸³ Condit, *Strategic Leadership*, 11.

⁸⁴ Marshall to Major General John Hines, 14 May 1943, cited in Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 192.

⁸⁵ Entry for 2 January 1942, Ferrell, *Diaries*, 40. Eisenhower wrote about the ABDA unity of command being a “[g]ood start;” Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 419. US expeditionary force supported by British fleet and air, with British land forces included, commanded by Eisenhower.

⁸⁶ Eisenhower, *Crusade*, 210.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 356-7.

⁸⁹ Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 510-2.

⁹⁰ Eisenhower, *Crusade*, 210.

⁹¹ Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 378-9.

⁹² Eisenhower, *Crusade*, 451.

⁹³ Marshall to Major General Robert Wood, 9 April 1936, Bland, *Soldierly Spirit*, 491.

⁹⁴ Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 35.

⁹⁵ Dooley, *Mentorship*, 17; Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 338.

⁹⁶ Eisenhower, *Crusade*, 76.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 54.

⁹⁸ Entry for 11 June 1943, Ferrell, *Diaries*, 94; Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 372.

⁹⁹ Entry for 10 December 1942, Ferrell, *Diaries*, 84.

¹⁰⁰ Eisenhower, *Crusade*, 216.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 74. His writing here clearly shows the operational artist and theater strategist at work, though Eisenhower used the term “commander’s strategic plan.

¹⁰² Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 43. A friend reminded Marshall of Marshall’s own adage, after you make a well-informed, thoughtful decision, no amount of worry will change it.

¹⁰³ Eisenhower, *Crusade*, 75.

¹⁰⁴ Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 306.

¹⁰⁵ Condit, *Strategic Leadership*, 12. Germany first, but did the coalition lead with Air Power, “direct approach” across the channel, or indirectly in the Mediterranean? Indirect action hurt American efforts in the Pacific.

¹⁰⁶ Stoler, *Soldier-Statesman*, 100-102. Marshall had British agreement to the direct approach, but Churchill went back to Roosevelt and undermined the agreement.

¹⁰⁷ Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 295. They lacked landing craft for the “bold” move Marshall suggested because they were shifting priority to Normandy.

¹⁰⁸ Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 372.

¹⁰⁹ Entry for 7 February 1944, Ferrell, *Diaries*, 111.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 330.

¹¹¹ Eisenhower, *Crusade*, 225-9.

¹¹² Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 381.

¹¹³ Eisenhower, *Crusade*, 246.

¹¹⁴ Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 486-7.

¹¹⁵ Steven Metz, “Eisenhower as Strategist: The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace.” Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute – Professional Readings in Military Strategy, No. 6, 1993, 6-7. This is an interesting commentary on boldness. It cites Clausewitz’s dictum that there is “no nobler quality” than boldness. This was an interesting analysis leading to Eisenhower as a strategist.

¹¹⁶ See Annex A for brief material that provides an overview of leadership trait theory, pros and cons.

¹¹⁷ Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 404-11.

¹¹⁸ Eisenhower, *Crusade*, 34.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 34-5.

¹²⁰ Dooley, *Mentorship*, 11.

¹²¹ Stoler, *Soldier-Statesman*, 113.

¹²² Dooley, *Mentorship*, 16.

¹²³ Marshall to George Pattullo, 29 December 1942, Bland, *The Right Man for the Job*, 496.

¹²⁴ Eisenhower, *Crusade*, 75. He used the example of the Duke of Wellington to illustrate how modern war was more complex and could not be run by one great man with the courage of his convictions. Modern war required huge staffs and wide responsibilities that elevated the importance of persuasion and administration, but leaders still needed the right traits to be successful.

¹²⁵ D. J. Haycock, *Eisenhower and the Art of Warfare: A Critical Appraisal*, Jefferson, North Carolina, McFarland and Company, Inc., 2004. This author argues strongly that Eisenhower, and Marshall, were not successful and would be judged as failures in the end. While his arguments are incomplete and ill-informed, he offers points to consider. In essence, his book offers a counter-argument to this paper.

¹²⁶ Field Manual 6-22, *Army Leadership*, October 2006, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/CAL/fm6_22.pdf, Glossary 2 and A-4, figure A-4, respectively.

¹²⁷ Marshall to Pershing, 24 November 1930, Bland, *Soldierly Spirit*, 363-8. See this for a good example of Marshall’s candor.

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- ¹²⁸ Ed Cray, *General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman*, New York, W. W. Norton and Company, 1990, 265-6; Nelsen, *Strategic Leadership*, 59.
- ¹²⁹ Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 411.
- ¹³⁰ Nelsen, *Strategic Leadership*, 60 and Cray, *General of the Army*, 151.
- ¹³¹ Ferrell, *Diaries*, 109. The editor notes that Marshall “exploded,” telling Churchill that “No American is going to land on that God-damned island! (speaking of the eastern Mediterranean island of Rhodes which was not militarily significant, but appealing to Churchill for some reason).
- ¹³² Entries between 29 May 1936 and 15 November 1936, Ferrell, *Diaries*, 20-2. Eisenhower seemed to know he would be “bawled out” by the boss, but pushed forward with news and data that MacArthur would not like or agree with. Later he referred to MacArthur as a “baby” and that he “still likes his bootlickers” (*Diary*, 44).
- ¹³³ Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 401.
- ¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 416.
- ¹³⁵ Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 186.
- ¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 336.
- ¹³⁷ Eisenhower, *Crusade*, 218.
- ¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 62.
- ¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 246.
- ¹⁴⁰ Encarta English Dictionary, online.
- ¹⁴¹ Entry for 25 June 1942, Ferrell, *Diaries*, 64. Eisenhower noted the top four things he stressed to leaders on 25 June 1942 as he assumed command of forces in England. One of the bullets, listed by Eisenhower as number three, was for all to show “determined enthusiasm and optimism...pessimism and defeatism [would] not be tolerated.” This almost secured a place for optimism in place of morale, but it is subordinated as a component of good morale.
- ¹⁴² Speech at Trinity College, 15 June 1941, Bland, *We Cannot Delay*, 534-8.
- ¹⁴³ Marshall to Brigadier General John Palmer, 12 March 1942, Bland, *The Right Man for the Job*, 129.
- ¹⁴⁴ Cray, *General of the Army*, 150.
- ¹⁴⁵ Eisenhower, *Crusade*, 454.
- ¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 315.
- ¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 237.
- ¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 238.
- ¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 210.
- ¹⁵⁰ E. K. G. Sixsmith, *Eisenhower as Military Commander*, New York, Stein and Day Publishers, 1972, 11. Author cites Eisenhower’s comments from *At Ease*. Morale discussed in some detail.

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